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公司治理的不同议程凸显了交易费用观点和产权理论的局限。自上而下的监督和控制可能有损于企业的竞争力。交易费用和代理费用所勾画出的机械图景源于公司理论的极端还原论。交易成本为零的科斯世界隐含着劳动分工的发展会降低社会交易成本即摩擦散热的假设,这既违反了热力学定律,也和工业化经济体发展的历史趋势背道而驰。演化经济学主张企业本质在于创新,方能更好的解释多样化的公司治理方式和企业文化。中国经济转型过程中多种所有制并存下的实践,对于研究产权变革和公司治理的生命周期提供了新的启示。企业的生存更大程度上维系于选择机制的产生和自身的适应能力。用增加交易成本来反对金融的市场监管,在金融危机中更证明为十分有害的观念。
The different agendas of corporate governance highlight the limitations of transaction cost perspectives and property rights theory. Top-down supervision and control may be detrimental to the competitiveness of the company. The mechanical picture delineated by transaction costs and agency fees stems from the extreme reductionism of company theory. The Coss World with zero transaction costs implied that the development of the division of labor would reduce the social transaction costs, that is, frictional heat dissipation, which violates the laws of thermodynamics and runs counter to the historical trend of the development of industrialized economies. Evolutionary economics advocates that the essence of an enterprise lies in innovation, so that it can better explain diversified corporate governance methods and corporate culture. The coexistence of diversified ownership systems in the process of China’s economic transition has provided new insights into the reform of property rights and the life cycle of corporate governance. The survival of the enterprise depends more on the generation of the selection mechanism and its own adaptability. The use of increasing transaction costs to oppose financial market supervision has proved to be very harmful in the financial crisis.